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STATE OF UTAH
H. C. HENINGER and DORIS W.
HENINGER,

]

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
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NINTH CIRCUIT COURT, State of
Utah, Washington County,
St. George Department, and
ROBERT F. OWENS, Circuit Judge,

Case No. 20976
)
Category No. 13b
]

Defendants-Appellants.

]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the District Court err in granting Plaintiffs
extraordinary relief in the form of an order prohibiting the
enforcement of the Circuit Court's directive revoking Plaintiffs'
bonding authority?
2. Did the District Court err in granting declaratory
relief, adjudicating Plaintiffs' rights and obligations under the
terms of the subject undertakings of bail?
3. Did the District Court err in concluding that the
subject undertakings of bail had been exonerated?
STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiffs as bail bondsmen petitioned the Fifth
Judicial District Court, Washington County, for declaratory
1

ludgment adjudicating their rights and obligations under tne
terms of certain undertakings of bail and further seeking
extraordinary relief to the extent necessary to prohibit the
Circuit Court's unjustified interference with Plaintiffs' bonding
business or enforcement of bail bonds which Plaintiffs claim to
have been exonerated.

The District Court granted summary

judgment declaring that the subject undertakings had been
exonerated by operation of law and prohibiting the enforcement of
the Circuit Court's directive revoking Plaintiffs' bonding
authority, which directive had been issued without affording
Plaintiffs notice or hearing.

Defendants, the Ninth Circuit

Court and Robert F. Owens, prosecute this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs have acted as bondsmen in the First Judicial
District for a period of twenty (20) years.

They applied for and

were granted the authority to act as bondsmen in the Fifth
District in January, 1984. By letter dated January 17, 1984, the
Defendants, at times herein referred to as "The Circuit Court",
approved Plaintiffs as bondsmen in the Ninth Circuit Court (R.
51-52, 59-60).

Plaintiffs, as authorized bondsmen, filed

undertakings of bail with the Circuit Court in certain cases
involving charges of driving under the influence (R. 18-19, 3039).
Three individuals by the name of Benally, Marshall and
Ashcroft, were charged with alcohol related offenses in the
Circuit Court.

Each was released on an undertaking of bail
2

provided by Plaintiffs. ... All-three .cf the above-mentioned
individuals entered pleas of guilty and each were sentenced to
sixty (60) days in the Washington County Jail with fifty-eight
(58) days of each sentence being suspended.

Each individual was

also sentenced to pay a fine and granted probation subject to
certain terms and conditions. Each of the individuals
surrendered himself to the Sheriff of Washington County and
served two days in the Washington County Jail beginning on
January 19, 1985, February 1, 1985, and February 20, 1985,
respectively (R. 20-22).
Another individual by the name of Greening entered a
plea of guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol.
Greening had previously been released on undertaking of bail
filed by Plaintiffs. On February 20, 1985, Greening was
sentenced to serve sixty (60) days in the Washington County Jail.
All but two days of his sentence was suspended and he was granted
the privilege of probation subject to certain terms and
conditions which included, as a part of sentence, the payment of
a fine and surcharges.

The Circuit Court, after entering

judgment and pronouncing sentence, stayed the execution of the
sentence until March 1# 1985. Greening failed to appear at the
Washington County Jail (R. 22-23).
Benally, Marshall and Ashcroft failed to abide by the
terms of the probation granted each of them in failing to pay the
fines as assessed as a part of their sentences (R. 20).
Plaintiffs requested the exoneration of the above3 ;;.

mentioned undertakings or. the grounds and for the reasons that
Benally, Marshall and Ashcroft had surrendered themselves in
execution of the sentence and on the grounds that Greeningf from
and after imposition of sentence, was in the custody of the
Circuit Court rather than in the custody of his bondsman and that
his bond was therefore exonerated by operation of law.

The

Circuit Court refused to exonerate these undertakings and took
the position that the undertakings continue through the entire
term of probation until all terms and conditions thereof had been
met (R. 20-26).
No judgments have been taken against Plaintiffs on any
of the undertakings.
This action was initiated by Plaintiffs in the Fifth
District Court on May 28, 1985, seeking declaratory and/or
extraordinary relief regarding their outstanding bonds. The
following day, May 29, 1985, the Circuit Court, without notice or
hearing revoked Plaintiffs' authorization to act as bail bondsman
in the Ninth Circuit Court and advised the Washington County
Sheriff that he was no longer authorized to accept Plaintiffs'
bonds (R. 24-26).
Thereafter, Plaintiffs amended their complaint seeking
extraordinary relief and alleging that the Circuit Court's action
in denying Plaintiffs authorization to file undertakings
constituted an abuse of discretion and/or was undertaken in
retaliation (R. 18-40).
The Fifth District Court in the Summary Judgment from
4

v:rAich this appeal is takenr ruled that the enforcement of the
Defendants' directive or order suspending or revoking Plaintiffsf
bonding authority was prohibited unless and until Plaintiffs were
provided with notice of the basis of any suspension or revocation
and given opportunity for full hearing on the issues of their
qualifications and fitness (R. 117-118).
The District Court also ruled that the undertakings of
bail filed on behalf of Benallyf Marshall, Ashcroft and Greening
were exonerated and that Plaintiffs' obligation was fulfilled by
producing the criminal defendant "at the times and places
required by the Court up to and including the time of sentence
and that the bail bond is exonerated upon the imposition of the
Courts sentence" (R. 117-118).
Plaintiffs submit that the foregoing is a brief but
accurate statement of the relevant facts as submitted to the
District Court.

In their Brief, Defendants assert that

Plaintiffs agreed to an oral expansion of the written bond
obligation extending the liability on the bond throughout any
period of probation which may ultimately be granted.

This

assertion was injected into the lawsuit by Affidavit of Judge
Owens filed after the District Court ruled but before the
execution and entry of the written pleadings (R. 95, 107).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs contend that the District Court acted
properly and within its jurisdiction in considering the rights
and obligations arising out of certain undertakings of bail,
5

Plaintiffs' complaint, clearly sought declaratory relief, the
rights and obligations were a proper subject for declaratory
relief and the record is devoid of any objection made on the
basis of the unavailability of declaratory relief.
Plaintiffs further contend that the Circuit Court acted
outside of its discretion or abused its discretion in summarily
revoking Plaintiffs' bonding authority and that the District
Court acted appropriately in prohibiting the enforcement of that
order until Plaintiffs were afforded due process of law.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the District Court
properly construed the statutory language relating to the
duration and termination of a bondsman's obligation and ruled in
harmony with traditional principles of criminal law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS POWER TO SUPERVISE THE
CIRCUIT COURT BY EXTRAORDINARY WRIT.
Article VIII, §5, Constitution of Utah, effective July
1, 1985, provides in part as follows:
The District court shall have original jurisdiction in
all matters except as limited by this constitution or
by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs.
[Emphasis added]
The power to issue such writs constitutes the power to
supervise, at least within the limited scope of the writs.
Section U.C.A. 78-3-4, clearly grants the District
Court supervisory jurisdiction over the Circuit Court.
as follows:

6

It reads

The district court snal have original jurisdiction in
all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the
Constitution and not prohibited by law; appellate
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals,
and a supervisory control of the same. The district
courts, or any judges thereof, shall have power to
issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo
warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and other writs
necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments
and decrees, and to give them a general control over
inferior courts and tribunals within their respective
jurisdictions. Under the general supervision of the
chief judge of the judicial council and subject to
policies established by the judicial council, cases
filed in the district court, which are also within
concurrent jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be
transferred to the circuit court by the presiding judge
of the district court in multiple judge districts, or
the district court judge in single judge districts.
The transfer of these cases may be made upon the
court's own motion or upon the motion of either party
for adjudication. When an order is made transferring a
case, the court must transmit the pleadings and papers
to the circuit court to which the case is transferred.
The circuit court shall have the same jurisdiction as
if the case had been originally commenced in the
circuit court and,any appeals from final judgments
shall run to the district court as provided for in
section 78-4-11 unless the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari shall order the appeal heard by the Supreme
Court.
Defendants argue that this section is unconstitutional
or has been repealed by implication as a result of the latest
amendments to our State Constitution.

Defendants provide us with

no legislative history which would indicate that the Legislature
intended or anticipated such a result.

Indeed, this section was

amended in 1983 to include all of the references to the Circuit
Court and the Judicial Council.

The Judicial Council acquired

constitutional status the following year by the amendment of
Article VIII of the Constitution of Utah.

The Legislature has

acted to harmonize the powers and authority of the District Court
7

with the responsibilities of the Judicial Council.

Plaintiffs

see nothing in the legislation or in the constitutional amendment
which would indicate that the statute as amended and reenacted in
1983 has been repealed by implication or that it is
unconstitutional merely by reason of the fact that the Judicial
Council has acquired constitutional status.
The Supreme Court and the District Court are the only
Courts of this State which are created by the Constitution.
Circuit Court was created by an act of the Legislature.

The

It is

inconceivable that the Legislature which has the power to create
or abolish the Circuit Court would not have power to provide for
its supervision.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
DECLARATORY OR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF.
Defendants' position apparently fails to recognize that
the District Court's jurisdiction was invoked under four separate
and distinct causes of action and relief was sought in the nature
of certiorari, prohibition, and declaratory judgment.

Inasmuch

as the arguments relating to the availability of relief vary from
one cause of action to another, Plaintiffs will treat them
separately herein.
In their First Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs asked that
the District Court require the Circuit Court to certify its
files, records and transcripts concerning the subject criminal
proceedings and asked that the District Court issue its writ

8

requiring Defendants tc discharge Plaintiffs from liability under
the subject undertakings.

In their Second Claim for Relief,

Plaintiffs requested declaratory judgment, asking the District
Court to "construe and interpret Utah law with respect to the
duties and obligations of the Plaintiffs under the facts and
circumstances as set forth in the above-mentioned criminal
proceedings and in similar proceedings."

In their Third Claim

for Relief, Plaintiffs asked that the District Court issue its
order enjoining the Defendants from in any way retaliating
against the Plaintiffs, including an order enjoining any
unjustified interference with Plaintiffs' bonding authority.
Finally, in the Fourth Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs asked that
the District Court exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over
Defendants and issue all orders and writs necessary in support
thereof "requiring Defendants to accept the Plaintiffs
undertaking barring some articulable and a justifiable reason for
refusing to honor the same."
Relief was granted in the following particulars:
1.

The District Court prohibited the enforcement of

the Circuit Court's directive terminating Plaintiffs1 bonding
authority "unless and until Plaintiffs are provided with notice
of the basis of any suspension or revocation of their bonding
authority and given opportunity for a full hearing on the issues
of their qualification and fitness to act as bondmen in the Ninth
Circuit Court."
2.

By way of declaratory relief, the District Court
9

determined that the subiect undertakings of bail nad been
exonerated.
3*

Finally the District Court exercised its

supervisory jurisdiction and articulated the nature and extent of
a bondsman's obligation in a criminal case.
A
AN ORDER OR WRIT IN THE NATURE OF PROHIBITION
IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY.
In State ex rel. Weaver v. Dostertf W. Va.f 300 S.E.2d
102 (1983), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found a
Writ of Prohibition to be an appropriate remedy for staying a
lower court's order revoking bonding authority until the bondsman
was provided notice and a hearing.
B
THE DISTRICT COURT APPROPRIATELY GRANTED
DECLARATORY RELIEF.
Defendants are determined to overlook the declaratory
aspects of the District Court Judgment and to attack the entire
Judgment on the basis of the unavailability of extraordinary
relief.
U.C.A. 78-33-1 provides as follows:
The district courts within their respective
jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations, whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed. No action or
proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground
that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.
The declaration may be either affirmative or negative
in form and effect; and such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree.

10

The District Court had power to "declare rights,
status, and other legal relationships" relating to the nature and
extent of the Plaintiffs1 obligations on subject undertakings of
bail.
Declaratory relief is not confined to cases where no
other relief was or could be granted.

Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah

339, 135 P.2d 251 (1943); Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445,
154 P.2d 748 (1944).

Indeed, the Declaratory Judgment Act is

remedial in nature and "its purpose is to settle and to afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights,
status, and other legal relations; and is to be liberally
construed and administered."

U.C.A. 78-33-12.
C

NO APPEAL WAS AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFFS NOR WAS
ANY SUCH RIGHT WAIVED.
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs could have appealed
the Circuit Court's ruling and that having failed to do so are
not entitled to seek declaratory or extraordinary relief in
determining their liability on outstanding undertakings of bail.
Contrary "to this assertion, there exists no final judgment from
which Plaintiffs could have perfected an appeal.
Whenever a minute entry is made indicating that a
criminal defendant failed to appear as required, that minute
entry "is deemed a forfeiture of the bail which has been posted."
U.C.A. 77-20a-l. No action can be initiated for the purpose of
taking judgment against a surety until sixty (60) days have
11

elapsed from the date of the forfeiture.

U.C.A. 77-20a-2.

Defendants have not initiated any proceeding against Plaintiffs
or obtained any final judgment against them as sureties on the
subject undertakings.
After the Defendants had indicated their intention to
enforce undertakings given on behalf of persons who had failed to
meet some condition of their probation, Plaintiffs initiated this
action in the District Court in an attempt to have their rights
and liabilities adjudicated prior to the initiation of a
multitude of actions in the Circuit Court to take judgment
against Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have no right of appeal under the rule
announced in People v. Tremayne, 3 Utah 331, 3 P. 85 (1884).
Defendants take the position that Tremayne no longer has any
application as a result of the many changes in the bail and court
structure which have occurred since that case was decided.
On page 6 of their Brief, Defendants state: "Moreover,
this Court has entertained an appeal from a circuit court bail
forfeiture order which had been appealed to the district court."
Defendants cite Walton v. Circuit Court, Utah, Case No. 16281
(Filed December 12, 1979) -and go on to say:

"Appealability of a

bond forfeiture order was not an issue, but the case was
successfully appealed to the district court and the district
court order was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court."

A photocopy

of the Third District Court pleadings in Walton (Verified
Complaint and Petition for Issuance of Certiorari and the Summary

12

Judgment) are attached hereto and designated as Addendum "A" and
"B",

Contrary to Defendants1 conclusions, the bail forfeitures

in Walton were not appealed to the District Court from the
Circuit Court.

A complaint for declaratory judgment and a

petition for extraordinary relief was filed with the District
Court.
A review of these pleadings in Walton will reveal that
the pleadings filed and the theories relied upon therein are
virtually identical to the course followed by Plaintiffs in the
instant action.
Plaintiffs act as surety on at least ten individual
undertakings of bail which Defendants have refused to exonerate.
If Plaintiffs' only remedy is to wait until the Circuit Court has
proceeded to judgment on each undertaking and appeal each
individual case to the District Court, the remedy can hardly be
deemed adequate.
POINT III
JUDGE OWENS HAS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION TO SUPERVISE
BONDSMEN IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT BUT THE REVOCATION
OF PLAINTIFFS1 BONDING AUTHORITY WAS IMPROPER.
It has been held that the deprivation, by revocation of
a license previously grantedf of the right to engage in the bail
bond business is a judicial act that must meet the requirements
of due process of law.

In Re Carterf 192 F.2d 15 (1951); Weaver

v. Dosterty supra.
In Carter, supra, the United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia, was considering the appropriateness of the
13

Federal District Court's action in denying a bondsman's
application to do business with the Court and referring tc an
earlier opinion involving the same bondsman stated the following:
On appeal we held the revocation invalid for lack of "a
hearing and revelation of all data upon which a
decision is to be based." We held that whatever might
be true of the grant of the right to engage in the
bonding business, and "the deprivation of that right,
once granted, is a judicial act, requiring due process
of law." 192 F.2d, p.16.
The Federal District Court had taken the position that
Carter's application was "in the administrative discretion of the
Court".

The Court of Appeals likened the application of a

bondsman to that of an attorney applying to practice before a
court and observed:
But both lawyers and bondsman are on quite different
footing from a Court's Clerk or Bailiff. They are not
completely under the Court's control, or obligated to
deal with the public impartially; within wide limits
they may chose how, when, where and whom they will
serve. They are not commonly paid from public funds,
their callings are not necessarily limited to a single
person or a few persons, they cannot be deprived of
their functions in a Court's discretion. 192 F.2d, pp.
16-17.
The Court of Appeals went on to state:
Old charges never brought to trial, and appellant's
innocent mistake of fact on an immaterial matter, do
not support the [revocation] order. Nor do any secret
charges that may have been made by anonymous informants
whom the appellant had no opportunity to confront and
cross examine. 192 F.2df p. 17.
The Court of Appeals concluded:
We do not imply that in our opinion the appealed order
would be valid if it were administrative. Like the
order involved in Carter's previous appeal, if it were
upheld, it would destroy an established business. We
do not imply that in our opinion a purely administrative refusal to renew, or to grant, a license to do
14

a lawful ousines? could be supported if based on
arbitrary grounds or made without such a "hearing and
opportunity to answer . . . as would constitute due
process." 192 F.2d, p. 17.
The Judgment appealed from in the instant case merely
prohibits the enforcement of any order or directive suspending or
evoking Plaintiff bonding authority unless Plaintiffs are first
provided with notice of the basis of any suspension or revocation
and given opportunity for full hearing on the issues of their
qualification and fitness.
Defendants have cited Taylor v. Waddey, 206 Tenn. 497,
334 S.W.2d 733 (1960).

The factual background in Waddey, supra,

is briefly stated as follows:
On May 13, 1959, one of the General Sessions Judges had
notice served by the Sheriff on the appellee bondsman
and bonding company to appear at a fixed place in the
courthouse of Davidson County on May 20th at a fixed
time "and then and there show cause why the order of
November 12, 1958, approving the Petition" etc. of the
bonding company and its power of attorney, should not
be revoked and canceled. On May 25th after the
hearing, pursuant to this Notice, the five Judges of
the General Sessions Courts of Davidson County entered
an order which among other things shows that "after the
unanimous decision of the five Judges of the General
Sessions Courts sitting en banke that the said Robert
Waddey oe permanently suspended from the writing of
bonds in The General Sessions Court and it is,
therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that said
Robert Waddey is from and after Friday, May 22, 1959,
permanently suspended from the writing of bonds in the
General Sessions Court, and further that the show cause
order in respect to The Athens Bonding Company be and
the same is indefinitely taken under advisement." 334
S.W.2d, p. 734.
Defendants apparently cite this case for the
proposition that a Court has inherent power to regulate the
bonding business and that the power extends to more than an
15

examination of financial responsibility out includes also moral
qualification.

With this premise Plaintiffs heartily agree.

Plaintiffs cite the case to provide the Court with a comparison
of the method by which the bonding authority was terminated in
that case as opposed to the method by which Plaintiffs1 bonding
authority was terminated in the instance case.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee went on to state:
So long as the bondsman complies with the statutes
above referred to and meets a fair and reasonable
standard in the conduct of his business before these
courts, then there is no one going to prevent him from
practicing his profession therein. 334 S.W.2d, p. 737.
Defendants quote the same language from Taylor v.
Waddey, supra, suggesting that Plaintiffs have somehow failed ro
meet "a fair and reasonable standard in the conduct of [their]
business" before the Ninth Circuit Court.

Plaintiffs challenge

Defendants to articulate one incident of misconduct supported by
the record of the District Court.
Plaintiffs agree that Judge Owens has authority and
discretion to supervise them in the conduct of their bonding
business before his court.

Plaintiffs merely asked the District

Court to determine the legality of the Circuit Court's policy
regarding the nature and extent of their obligation on certain
bail bonds.

The Circuit Court responded by arbitrarily

terminating their bonding authority without notice and without
hearing.

Plaintiffs fail to see that any discretion was

exercised and if such conduct constitutes the exercise of
discretion, it is an abuse thereof.
16

POINT IV
THE SUBJECT UNDERTAKINGS OF BAIL HAVE BEEN
EXONERATED BY OPERATION OF LAW.
U.C.A. 1953 Section 77-20-7(1) provides as follows:
The principal and the sureties on the written
undertaking are liable thereon during all proceedings
and for all appearances required of the defendant up to
and including the surrender of the defendant in
execution of any sentence imposed irrespective of any
contrary provision in the undertaking. [Emphasis Added]
U.C.A. 77-20-8 provides pertinent part:
Upon convictionf by plea or trial, the court may order
a defendant to be taken into custody or may order bail
continued pending imposition of sentenced [Emphasis
added.]
The two sections are harmonized when read in
conjunction with U.C.A. 77-18-1 which reads in pertinent part as
follows:
On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any
crime of offense, except in the case of class C
misdemeanors, for which supervised probation by the
Department of Corrections may not be imposed, and if it
appears compatible with the public interest, the court
may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and
place the defendant on probation for a period of time
it may determine, unless otherwise provided by law.
The legal custody of all probationers referred to the
Department of Corrections is vested in the court having
jurisdiction and the Department of Correction. The
legal custody of all unsupervised probationers is
vested in the court having jurisdiction of the
offender"! [Emphasis added.]
The Circuit Court takes the position that an
undertaking remains in force and effect after sentence is imposed
and until such time as the conditions of probation, if granted,
are met.
A bail bond serves a three-fold purpose:
17

(1) it

permits release of a defendant from incarceration; (2) it
delivers the custody of the defendant to the bail bondsman; and
(3) it guarantees the personal appearance of the defendant for
trial and for imposition of sentence.
Benally, Marshall and Ashcroft appeared for the
imposition of sentence.

They were all granted probation as a

condition of which they were to each to serve two days in the
Washington County Jail.

Each of these defendants surrendered

themselves to the custody of the Sheriff of Washington County and
upon completion of this imprisonment they left the jail pursuant
to the order of probation, not by reason
bail.

of the undertakings of

It cannot be said that they were still on bail while

committed to jail.
of bail.

Commitment to jail terminates the obligation

U.C.A. 77-20-8(2).
By the order of probation, each of these defendants was

committed to the legal custody of the Circuit Court.

Each of

these three defendants surrendered themselves to the actual
custody of the Washington County Sheriff.
Greening, on the other hand, while not submitting
himself to the physical custody of the Sheriff of Washington
County was, as a probationer, from and after the entry of the
order of probation, in the legal custody of the Circuit Court
rather than in the custody of his bail bondsman.

U.C.A. 77-18-1.

An interesting anomaly arises when U.C.A. 77-20-8(2) is
applied to the Circuit Court's policy.

Under that section, a

bail bondsman is entitled to effect the surrender of a defendant
18

for whom he has bonded by delivering a certified copy of the
undertaking to a peace officer who then detains the defendant in
his custody "as upon a commitment."
In commenting upon this anomalyf a California Court of
Appeals in People v. Doey 172 Cal. App.2d 812, 342 P.2d 533
(1959) stated:
But if the court has granted the defendant probation,
the power to surrender the defendant not only would
defeat the purpose of probation, but would impair its
operation, as both the court and the sureties would
have the control of the defendant.
*

*

*

If bond were still in effect after a probation order
was made which did not impose incarceration as a term
thereof, a surrender of the defendant to the jailer by
the bondsman would be an idle act; because the jailer
would then have no authority to imprison the defendant,
she being free on the terms of the probation order.
An order granting probation without imposing
incarceration as a term thereof, frees from jail a
defendant who has been unable to post bail. It is
inconsistent that a defendant, who is on bail, should
be in a less favorable position than such a prisoner,
or that he should continue in the technical custody of
his bondsman.
In Rodman v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.2d 262, 89
P.2d 109, the court held that when a defendant appears
at the "time for pronouncement of judgment" under Pen.
Code sec. 1191 (which is also the time for hearing of
an application for probation), the surety is entitled
to be exonerated upon application. This is
inconsistent with the theory that if at the time of
such appearance and hearing, the defendant is granted
probation, the bail bond still continues in a state of
suspended animation, to be revived if ever probation is
revoked. 342 P.2d, p. 537.
See also Trammel v. State, Tex. Crim., S.W.2d 528
(1975).
Plaintiffs submit that the Circuit Court1s policy is in
direct contradiction to the statutory directives of the Utah Code
19

and that from and after the imposition of sentence, the criminal
defendants, and each of them, were in the custody of the Circuit
Court and no longer in the custody of the Plaintiffs or in any
way subject to the Plaintiffs' control.
A criminal defendant cannot be compelled, at the price
of his liberty, between the date of his arrest and the close of
his trial, to give a bond guaranteeing the performance of a
sentence which the law presumes will never be imposed upon him as
an innocent man.

He can only be required, at the outset of any

prosecution, to give a bond guaranteeing his appearance through
all stages of a criminal proceedings until such time as the court
acquires custody of his person upon judgment of conviction.
Finally, Plaintiffs briefly addressed the allegation
that Plaintiffs entered into an oral agreement with the Circuit
Court expanding the terms and conditions of the subject
undertakings.

In their brief, Defendants state that

,f

[t]he

language of the individual bonds provides that the terms would
continue through execution of sentence."

Defendants then support

the statement by referring, not to the written undertakings but,
to a letter from Judge Owens to the Sheriff of Washington County
and an Affidavit filed by the Judge following the District
Court's ruling (R. 61, 107). Plaintiffs have attached all of the
subject undertakings of bail as addendum hereto for the purpose
of demonstrating that the written undertakings contain no such
language.

(Addendum C, D, E and F.)
Plaintiffs categorically deny any such oral expansion
20

of their obligations under the subject undertakings.
Furthermore, Defendants' argument is without merit for the
following reasons:

(1) Defendants failed to properly raise the

issue in the District Court; (2) any such attempt to orally
expand Plaintiffs' obligations would be unenforceable under the
statute of frauds and evidence of any such attempted expansion
would be inadmissible under the parol evidence rule; and (3) the
applicable statutes define the nature and extent of the sureties
obligations and the statute governs "irrespective of any contrary
provision in the undertaking."

U.C.A. 77-20-7.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the District Court
acted appropriately in granting declaratory relief and
adjudicating disputed rights and obligations existing between the
parties.

The court ruled without any objection being made by

Defendants regardina the availability of declaratory relief.
Indeed, such an araument would have been without merit.
The District Court further acted appropriately in
granting extraordinary relief to the extent that such relief was
appropriate in enjoining the enforcement of the Circuit Court's
directive which had deprived Plaintiffs of their bonding
authority without notice or hearing.
Finally, Plaintiffs submit that the District Court's
ruling concerning the duration and exoneration of the subject
undertakings of bail is the only interpretation which harmonizes
all of the relevant statutory law and is in harmony with
21

traditional principles of criminal and constitutional law.
The District Court should be affirmed in all respects,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / $~

/s/

^

day of May, 1986.

.

Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on this /$"" day of May, 1986,
I did personally mail a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing Brief of Respondents to David L. Wilkinson, Attorney
General, Diane W. Wilkins, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
Secretary
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Konald C. barker \ - ^^>*>-«- / j
Attorney fc: nlainTllfs ' '"J
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: 486-9636

.. er^j^v/^ (?.. -^ iW . .
. T."."/; f t'"^ •''
" ''"A
4/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
VINCENT P. WALTON, as
)
general partner of BEEHIVE
BAIL BONDS, a limited part- )
nership, and LEO G. BATEMAN
and GLADYS M. BATEMAN,
)
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF
UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT,
and the HONORABLE MAURICE
D. JONES, Circuit Judge,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND
PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF
CERTIORARI
*?& trprftw
Civil No. C 7 8 - _ _ 2 _ L _ _ _ _ ^

00O00

Plaintiffs complain and allege against the defendants as follows:
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
1.

The plaintiff Behive Bail Bonds is a limited

partnership organized and existing under the Laws of the
State of Utah, with Vincent P. Walton as the sole general
partner.

The plaintiffs Leo G. Bateman and Gladys M. Bate-

man, hereinafter referred to as "Batemans," are husband and
wife, and are the persons who, for and on behalf of Beehive
Bail Bonds executed and filed the undertakings in bail which
are the subject matter of this lawsuit, and whose bail bonds
the defendatns have ordered forfeited.

The plaintiff Leo G.

Bateman is the sole limited partner in Beehive Bail Bonds.
2.

That the defendant Circuit Court is a duly

organized and existing Court of the State of Utah, as provided by 78-4-1, UCA, 1953, et seq., and the defendant Jones
is a judge of said Court.
3.

The District Court has supervisory control

over the Circuit Court as provided by 78-3-**. UCA, 1953,
Art. VIII, £ 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah,
Rule 65B, URCP, including the power to issue writs of mandamus, injunction, certiorari, prohibition, and other writs
necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments and
decrees, and to give them a general control over inferior
courts and tribunals, including the defendants in this
matter.

This is an appropriate case for the exercise of

that power to control the acts of the defendants herein, it
appearing that plaintiff herein has no standing to appeal
the orders forfeiting the bail or denying the motions to
exonerate the bail bonds since the bail bondsmen are not
parties to the criminal proceedings in the Salt Lake City
Court.

See People v. Tremayne, 3 U. 331, 3 P. 85.
4.

That plaintiffs filed undertakings of bail

with the City Court of Salt Lake City, in the following
cases, copies of which are annexed hereto as exhibits "A",
"B", "C" and "D".

In each instance a fine was imposed upon

the defendant which the defendant in each of those cases has
failed to pay:
#A0130669 - Donald J. Cromer
0AO253135 - George Tovar
#A0253135 - David George Crenshaw, aka David
Gregory
0AO271648 - Michael Rulin Hedelius
5.

In each of the above-mentioned cases the

Honorable Maurice D. Jones, Judge of the Circuit Court
(which has taken over the functions of the Salt Lake City
Court) has ordered the undertaking in bail filed by plaintiffs herein forfeited by reason of non-payment of said
fines by the defendants in the cases listed in 1 3 above,
and has denied plaintiffs* herein motion to exonerate said
bonds.

A copy of the orders denying said motions is annexed

hereto as exhibits "E'\ "F", "G" and "H".
6.

Under the terms of said undertakings, exhibits

"A" thru "D", the obligation of plaintiff herein is limited
to (u) assuring the appearance of the defendants in those

cases before the lower court to answer trie charge, to (b)
assure that said defendants would at all times hold (or
surrender) themselves amenable to the orders and process of
the court, (c) and if convicted, that they would appear for
judgment and (d) render themselves in execution thereof.
There is no agreement in said exhibits "A" thru n D" that the
bail bondsman would pay any fine which might be imposed by
the Court.
7.

Under the terms of applicable laws and stat-

utes, including but not limited to the provisions of 77-3313, 77-35-4, 77-43-22, 77-43-23, 77-43-24, 77-43-25, UCA,
1953, the liability and obligation of plaintiffs herein b>
reason of said bail bonds, exhibits "A" thru "D", terminated, was extinguished and liability under those bail bonds
was exonerated at the time that the Court imposed sentence
upon those defendants.
8.

The order of the Circuit Court (and City

Court) forfeiting the bail bonds and denying the motion to
exonerate the bonds was and is void, contrary to law, and
should be vacated and set aside, and the defendants should
be ordered and directed to do so.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
9.

Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference

thereto all of the allegations contained in the first claim
for relief above.
10.

This action is a suit for declaratory judg-

ment as provided by Title 78, Chapter 33, UCA, 1953, and
other applicable laws. The defendants are all of the parties required to be made parties to this action as provided
by 78-33-11, UCA, 1953.
11.

The Court should declare, as provided by 78-

33-2, UCA, 1953, the rights, status, obligations and legal
relations between the plaintiffs and defendants with respect
to the obligation, if any of a bail bondsman to pay a fine
-3-

A

imposed by the Court after a finding of guilt or plea of
guilt has Deen entered.
12.

Under the provisions of the statutes and laws

mentioned in H 7 above, including 77-33-13, 77-43-23, 77-4324, 77-33-25, UCA, 1953, surrender of the person on whose
behalf the undertaking in bail was filed exonorates the bail
bond, regardless of the disposition of the charges pending
against that person, and whther or not he pays any fine that
may be imposed by the Court in that proceeding.

The Hon-

orable Maurice D. Jones has ruled that surrender of the
person for whom the undertaking was filed does not exonoratc
the undertaking in bail, and that the bail bondsman remains
liable thereunder to guarantee payment of any fine that is
imposed, and the performance of any other conditions imposed
by the Court order, which would presumably include performance of conditions of probation, etc.
13.

It is in the interests of orderly administra-

tion of justice and the rights of the parties, that the
Court construe and interpret whether or not surrender of the
person for whom an undertaking in bail has been filed by a
bail bondsman exonorates and discharges that bond, and if
not, what duties and obligations the bail bondsman has after
the surrender of the person for whom the undertaking in bail
was filed.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
14.

Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference

thereto and re-allege all of the allegations in the first
and second claims for relief, above.
15.

The Court should construe and interpret

whether or not a finding of guilt or a plea of guilty by the
person for whom the undertaking in bail has been filed
accompanied by his appearance before the Court, exonorates
the undertaking in bail.

In the alternative, the Court

should declare whether or not the imposition of sentence by
-4-

5

the Court after a findirtf of guilt or plea of guilty by the
person for whom an undertaking in bail has been filed,
accompanied by his appearance before the Court, exonorates
the undertaking in bail.

It is the position of plaintiffs

that eitner of said acts (finding or plea of guilty or
imposition of sentence, together with his appearance before
the Court) discharges the bail bondsman and exonorates the
undertaking in bail.

Among other things, the person is then

in the custody of the Court and the bail bondsman has no
further rights or duties concerning him.
mentioned in \}

6 and 12 above.

See also statutes

It is the position of the

defendants that saic acts or events do not discharge the
bail bondsman fror liability or exonerate the undertaking in
bail.

See first claim for relief above, and exhibits "E"

thru "11 attached hereto.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
16.

Plaintiffs incorporate herein bv reference

thereto all of the allegations in the first, second and
third claims for relief, above.
17.

The Court should declare, construe and inter-

pret the circumstance'-, terms and conditions upon and/or
under which a b^il Doaasman can be and/or is relieved of
further liability, duties or responsibilities on his undertaking in bail, and tne acts or things which he is required
to do and/or whicti must occur to terminate his liability and
obligations.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against
the defendants and/or declaring, interpreting and construing
the rights, duties and obligations of the parties and of
bail bondsmen under Utah Law, under the usual form of undertaking on bail in use in Utah (see exhibits "A" thru "D"
attached), as follows:
18.

For the issuance of a writ of certiorari

directing the defendants to certify to the District Court
-5-

tneir entire- files, recorcs anc transcript concerning the
cases listed in \ a above, including tne proceedings and
orders pertaining to proceedings for forfeiture of tne
undertakings on bail of the plaintiff herein in those cases,
and orders entered in connection therewith.
19.

On the first claim for relief for a writ of

mandate requiring the defendants to discharge the plaintiffs
herein from liability under, and to exonorate the undertakings in bail filed by plaintiffs herein on behalf of the
persons accused in the cases listed in K 4 above, and for a
writ of prohibition prohibiting the defendants from forfeiting the undertaking on bail in said cases, from taking or
permitting the taking or prosecuting of any proceedings to
require the payment of any amounts by plaintiffs herein by
reason of and/or as a result of the filing of the undertakings in bail filed in said cases by the plaintiff herein,
including prohibiting the defendants from causing the removal
of plaintiffs' signs offering bail bonding service from the
jail or other public places, or from otherwise interfering
with the conduct by plaintiffs herein of their bail bonding
business bv reason of and/or as a result of this lawsuit 01
the undertakings in bail filed in connection with those
matters, or the failure of plaintiffs herein to pay the
amount of the bail forfeiture in those cases.
20.

On the second claim for relief for declara-

tory judgment construing and interpreting Utah Law with
respect to the duties and obligations of bail bondsmen after
surrender of the accused to the jail, police or other appropriate public official, and determining that upon such an
occurance the undertaking in bail is exonorated and that the
bail bondsman is thereupon discharged from further liability
or obligation by reason of that undertaking.
21.

On the third claim for relief for declaratory

judgment construing and interpreting Utah Law with respect
-6-

t

the duties and ooiigations " f tail bondspe:, aftci a

finding of guilt, and after imposition of sentence, adjudging that upon such an occurrence the undertaking in bail is
exonorated and that the bail bondsman is thereupon discharged from further liability or obligations by reason of
that undertaking.
22.

On the fourth claim for relief for declara-

tory judgment construing and interpreting Utah Law to declare
the circumstances, terms and conditions upon and/or under
which a bail bondsman can be and/or is relieved from further
liability, duties or responsibilities on his undertaking in
bail, and the acts or things which he is required to do
and/or which must occur to terminate his liability anc
obligations.
23.

For such other and further relief as the

Court deems proper in trie circumstances.
Dated this 2i

day of August, 1978.

Ronald C. Barker, attorney lor
plaintiffs
STATE OF UIAH

)
:

SS .

County of Salt Lake)
LLO G. BATEMAN, GLADYS M. BATEMAN and VINCE WALTON, being each first duly sworn, each on his oath deposes
and says that he is a plaintiff in the above-entitled matter; that he has read the foregoing complaint and petition
for writ of certiorari and is familiar with the statemetns
of fact contained therein; that each of said statemetns is
true of his own knowledge except for statements made on
information and belief and as to each such statement he
believes it to be true; that just cause exists for the
prosecution of this matter, for the issuance of a writ of
certiorari, and for declaratory judgment defining the rights,
duties and obligations of bail bondsmen; that different
-7-

8

juages cf tr.e Circuit Court, Salt LaKe Cit\ Department,
construe the rights, duties and obligations of bail bondsmen
in an manner substantially different from the manner in
which they are construed by the Honorable Maurice D. Jones,
that it is in the interests of justice and orderly judicial
proceedings that the rights, duties and obligations of bail
bondsmen be defined by this Court.
Dated this

J?

day of August, 1978.

(

/

7

Leo G. Bateman

\!Lf
letJ
' r if '
Gladys M.,/ Bateman

/t^^f^—

Vince Walton

7

U ,?,r. i~>

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

K

day

of August, 1978.
s

Notary Public residing at Salt Lake
City /Utah
My commission expires: 7^nt'\ l£ \ i / /' ,•-

Plaintiffs' addresses:
1146 E a ^ 2700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84115

3249 South
West Temple
jzay
boutn west
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

-8-

Ov
honalc v, barRcr
Attornev n>r plaintiffs
2870 Soutt State Street
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 8411:Telephone: 486-963e
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IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC1
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
00O00
VINCENT P. WALTON, et al. f

)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

)

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF
)
UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT
LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, and
)
the HONORABLE MAURICE D.
JONES, Circuit Judge,
Defendants.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. C 78-5004

)
)
ooOoo

Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in the
above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing at the
hour of 10:00 a.m. on the 31st day of October, 1978, before
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, District Judge.

Plaintiffs

were represented by Ronald C. Barker and defendants were
represented by Robert R. Wallace, Assistant Attorney General.

Oral arguments were presented by respective counsel.

It appearing to the Court that the undertakings in bail
filed with the defendants do not constitute an undertaking
that the defendant on whose behalf the undertaking was iiled
will pay a fine that may be assessed against that person by
the defendants and that the obligation of plaintiff under
the terms of that bail bond and applicable law is limited to
the obligations to produce the defendant at appropriate
times and places up to and including the time of sentencing, but not thereafter.

The Court being fully advised in

the premises and good cause appearing therefor, it is
hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The defendants are ordered to exonerate the

undertakings in bail filed by plaintiff and to discharge and
-1-

release the plaintiffs fron liability under tne follower:*.
bail bonds filed by plaintiffs with defendants.
Case IA0130669 - Donald J. Cromer
Case IA0253135 - George Tovar
Case #A0253135 - David George Crenshaw, aka David
Gregory
Case IA0271648 - Michael Rulin Hedelius
Defendants are restrained, enjoined and prohibited frorr
forfeiting the bail posted by plaintiff in those cases; irom
in any manner taking or prosecuting any proceedings to
require payment of any amounts by reason of non-payment by
the defendants in those cases of their fines imposed by the
defendants; from causing the removal of plaintiffs' signs
ottering their bail bonding service trom the jail or other
puolic places, or from otnerwise interrenng wirn tr.e conduct by plaintiffs of their bail bonding business DV reason
of non-payment of said fines and the failure of plamtir:
herein to pav said fines on behalf of the defendants in
tnose cases.
2.

The Court determines that the obligation of

tne bail bonasman is fulfilled by the producing the oerson
tor whom the bail was posted at the times and places reauirec
by the Court up to and including the time of sentencing, anc
that under tne provisions or 77-33-13, UCA, 1955, anc otner
applicable laws, that the bail bond is exonoratea upon entry
of a plea by the person for whom the bond is furnished,
unless the bail bondsman agrees that the bond may continue
thereafter.
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Dated the <&*! BY
day
ofCOURT:
November, 1978.
THE
w t ATTEST
»
W

-ST£'flLpG EVANS

^ ^ ^ ^

s&At

District Judge

*1<X

u
WASHINGTON COUNTY** ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT

Plaintiff )

j^UJuAk]

UNDERTAKING
OF BAIL

vs.
for*/P.*

r-Vy

Criminal
No.

^ > i> r. * / / / t ? < . ^

j /

/
,'
Defendant(s)~)Y
(include address and DOB) )

UNDERTAKING
An order was made on the date of

A/QU

'-?,/¥&/

that the defendant be held to answer upon a charge of

fj

hy the above court,
:T

( j -(

Bail was set in the amount of $ ^>'-> ^ *
We, the undersigned H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER, of
Logan, Utah, Cache County, State of Utah, jointly and severally undertake that
the defendant £ c»; (e&y U^ ' <'<£ hj g i^j't*m/
will appear and answer the charge
mentioned above ta whatever court it may be presented, and that he will at all
times hold himself amenable to the orders and proceedings of the court, including
all appearances required of him by the court up to and including his surrender in
execution of any sentence irrespective of any contrary provision contained herein,
or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that he will pay to the plantiff
the sum of $ 5 ^ < T ^ ' ^ ' ? anc* if the defendant does not make payment after
the forfeiture of the bond, judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff and
against us as sureties for the amount set forth.
We hereby submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably
appoint the clerk of the court as our agent upon whom any papers affecting our
liability on this undertaking may be served, and that our liability may be inforced
on motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of
an independent action.

iESWijrR

IUO

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss
County of

)

Sureties* names and addresses:
H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER
746 North 100 West Logan, Utah 84321

The sureties whose names are subscribed to the above undertaking, being sworn,
each for himself, says: that he is a real or personal property holder within the
State of Utah, and is worth the sum in the undertaking specified as the penalty
thereof, over and above all his just debts and liabilities, exclusive of property
exempt from execution.

Surety

H.C. HENINGER

Surety

DORIS W. HENINGER

Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date of

~ -

<Seal>

\

Notary Public y

Residing * A , ; : \\.\:

U

U U 1,

J

J^ / Y -

My commission expires

' ^ i~ ti\ / * ^

The above undertaking is hereby accepted, and the sureties are approved.
Dated

Circuit Judie

WASHINGTON COUNTY** ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT

Plaintiff

UNDERTAKING
OF BAIL

vs.

Criminal
No.

Defendant(s)
(include address and DOB)
SauAz

Motel fr do?

UNDERTAKING
An order was made on the date of Oio^ &- ,/frss"

by the above court,

that the defendant be held to answer upon a charge of OUT

A/o-

//xi**'s

r

L ic*t*i>?

Bail was set in the amount of $ £/&

&°

We, the undersigned H.C HEN1NGER and DORIS W. HENINGER, of
Logan, Utah, Cache County, State of Utah, jointly and severally undertake that
the defendant 5<*^ug ( SefifllL,
will appear and answer the charge
mentioned above in whatever court it may be presented, and that he will at all
times hold himself amenable to the orders and proceedings of the court, including
all appearances required of him by the court up to and including his surrender in
jexecution of any sentence irrespective of any contrary provision contained herein,
or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that he will pay to the plantiff
the sum of $ /^/^/^°
; and if the defendant does not make payment after
the forfeiture of the bond, judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff and
against us as sureties for the amount set forth.
We hereby submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably
appoint the clerk of the court as our agent upon whom any papers affecting our
liability on this undertaking may be served, and that our liability may be inforced
on motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of
an independent action.

• -.:'• . M

' •''
Surety

H.C. HENINGER

/•

]L

DORIS W. HENINGER

Surety

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss
County of

)

Sureties' names and addresses:
H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER
746 North 100 West Logan, Utah 84321

The sureties whose names are subscribed to the above undertaking, being sworn,
each for himself, says: that he is a real or personal property holder within the
State of Utah, and is worth the sum in the undertaking specified as the penalty
thereof, over and above all his just debts and liabilities, exclusive of property
exempt from execution.

o
Surety

H.C. HENINGER

DORIS W. HENINGER

Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date of

£~ \

Notary Public \ V £ _ J )

My commission expires

The above undertaking is hereby accepted, and the sureties are approved.
Dated

Circuit Judge

WASHINGTON COUNTY" ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT

y c f v 7\CKi v r -r -:
\\\z- v*:

-•J C:e/fe cf th: ^
-irlraani, Stete o. t: *,

Plaintiff )

''. uoume..U\ ** • ''i - ^-"fr "
WITNESS) my Kar^ ano LO J o

UNDERTAKING
OF BAIL

r^t^N Pa-ag-tt:....
^ I Li l"

ipm£_

VS.

CUrk of Court c

Criminal
No.

!
Defendant(s) )
(include address and DOB)

0 5^"TF' u:)J

UNDERTAKING
An order was made on the date of

^cx«~

;& / y ^ < ^ hy the above court,

that the defendant be held to answer upon a charge of

TJ, (A 4

. Bail was^et in the amou
a
»pt6tj[:

^.t>^

«s:s5

We, the undersigned H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER, of
Logan, Utah, Cache County, State of Utah, jointly and severally undertake that
the defendant vV*Phn^ ArouU*,
^SJBL will appear and answer the charge
mentioned above in wnatever court it may be presented, and that he will at all
times hold himself amenable to the orders and proceedings of the court, including
all appearances required of him by the court up to and including his surrender in
execution of any sentence irrespective of any contrary provision contained herein,
or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that he will pay to the plantiff
the sum of $_SJSJSL!^£
; and if the defendant does not make payment after
the forfeiture of the bond, judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff and
against us as sureties for the amount set forth.
We hereby submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably
appoint the clerk of the court as our agent upon whom any papers affecting our
liability on this undertaking may be served, and that our liability may be inforced
on motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of
an independent action.
\J

H.C. HENINGER

DORIS W. HENINGER

Surety

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss
County of

)

Sureties' names and addresses:
H . C HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER
746 North 100 West Logan, Utah 84321

The sureties whose names are subscribed to the above undertaking, being sworn,
each for himself, says: that he is a real or personal properly holder within the
State of Utah, and is worth the sum in the undertaking specified as the penalty
thereof, over and above all his just debts and liabilities, exclusive of property
exempt from execution.
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B.C. HENINGER
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DORIS W. HENINGER

Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date of

\ LWAXY

(\x

(Seal)
My commission expires
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The above undertaking is hereby accepted, and the sureties are approved.
Dated

V

GEORGE DEPARTMENT

CO

WASH.
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Plaintiff
^tfvU

UNDERTAKING

pi UddU

OF BAIL
vs.

Criminal
No.

I2-3"&C>
Defendant(s)
(include address and DOB)
22M tt-3frb\D(-d S1 bt-rfcf pt

&mi?

UNDERTAKING
An order was made on the date of -V^>i <\\ v ~2-H , \Q ?.S hy the above court,
that the defendant be held to answer upon a charge of [YU -X
Bail was set in the amount of $ Fiof HundredFM* Fro* bolldit
We, the undersigned H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER, of
Logan, Utah, Cache County, State of Utah, jointh and severally undertake that
the defendant rNsMfri\*«mfMWrw UVusWUi
will appear and answer the charge
mentioned above in whatever court it may be presented, and that he will at all
times hold himself amenable to the orders and proceedings of the court, including
all appearances required of him by the court up to and including his surrender in
execution of any sentence irrespective of any contrary provision contained herein,
or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that he will pay to the plantiff
the sum of $ 6b&.^K
; and if the defendant does not make payment after
the forfeiture of the bond, judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff and
against us as sureties for the amount set forth.
We hereby submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably
appoint the clerk of the court as our agent upon whom any papers affecting our
liability on this undertaking may be served, and that our liability may be inforced
on motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of
an independent action.
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H.C. HENINGER
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>
Surety
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DORIS W. HENINGER
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Surely
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STATE OF UTAH

)

County of

)

) ss
Sureties9 names and addresses:
H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER
746 North 100 West Logan, Utah 84321

The sureties whose names are subscribed to the above undertaking, being sworn,
each for himself, says: that he is a real or personal property holder within the
State of Utah, and is worth the sum in the undertaking specified as the penalty
thereof, over and above all his just debts and liabilities, exclusive of property
exempt from execution.
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Surety

H.C. HENINGER
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Surety

^

DORIS W. HENINGER

Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date of

is

Notary
Nota Public^ *

(Seal)
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hiding at

r*— /
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.J-

My commission expires - - \ t'^i I./
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The above undertaking is hereby accepted, and the sureties are approved.
Dated

Circuit Judfte
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Plaintiff
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(include address and DOB)
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A n order was made on the date of
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that the defendant be held to answer upon a charge of _
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W e , the undersigned H . C . HENINGER and DORIS W. H E N I N G E R , of
Lo in. Utah, Cache County, State of Utah, jointly and severally undertake that
the defendant
JL
will appear and answer the charge
mentioned above in whatever court it may be presented, and that he will at all
times hold himself amenable to the orders and proceedings of the court, including
all appearances required of him by the court up to and including his surrender in
execution of any sentence irrespective of any contrary provision contained herein,
or if he fails to perform any of these conditions that he will pay to the plantiff
the sum of $ <s\<T**^
; and if the defendant does not make payment after
the forfeiture of the bond, judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiff and
against us as sureties for the amount set forth.
W e hereby submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably
appoint the clerk of the court as our agent upon whom any papers affecting our
liability on this undertaking may be served, and that our liability may be inforced
o n motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of
an independent action.
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DORIS W. HENINGER
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AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF UTAH

)

) ss

County of

)

Sureties' names and addresses:
H.C. HENINGER and DORIS W. HENINGER
746 North 100 West Logan, Utah 84321

The sureties whose names are subscribed to the above undertaking, being sworn,
each for himself, says: that he is a real or personal property holder within the
State of Utah, and is worth the sum in the undertaking specified as the penalty
thereof, over and above all his just debts and liabilities, exclusive of property
exempt from execution.
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H.C. HENINGER
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Surety

DORIS W. HENINGER

Subscribed and sworn to before me on the date of
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\ .
Notary Public
\. .1

(Seal)
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B,disn.fl
Residing at. V • ; , • \ '. v
My commission expires.

The above undertaking is hereby accepted, and the sureties are approved.
Dated
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